THE WORKPLACE IN A RACIALLY DIVERSE
SOCIETY: PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS ON THE
ROLE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW

Cynthia L. Estlundt
President Clinton stirred some hope, along with some cynicism, in his
effort to initiate a "national conversation about race."' Race
unquestionably divides Americans-particularly black and white
Americans-in their experiences and in their perceptions of the world, of
social policy, and of each other. Few question the need for a more honest
discussion of racial divisions, their causes, and their potential cures. There
is, on the other hand, good reason to question our ability to reach a societal
consensus about what to do and to put a realistic plan into effect.3 But
t Leroy G. Denman, Jr., Regents Professor of Law, University of Texas School of
Law. I appreciate the helpful comments of my colleagues Lynn Baker, Willy Forbath, Sam
Issacharoff, and Doug Laycock on earlier drafts. I would also like to acknowledge the
excellent research assistance of Mike Leitch and Tom Nesbitt. All errors are my own.
1. See, e.g., Clinton, at Meeting on Race, Struggles to Sharpen Debate, N.Y. TIMEs,
Dec. 4, 1997, at A-1. I use the term "race," and the corresponding terms "black" and
"white" and "African-American" and "Anglo-American," in accordance with conventional
usage. At the same time, I recognize the telling critique of this terminology by Orlando
Patterson, who argues for the substitution of "ethnicity" for "race," "Afro-American" for
See ORLANDO
"black" and "African-American," and "Euro-American" for "white."
PATIERSON, THE ORDEAL OF INTEGRATION: PROGRESS AND RESENTMENT IN AMERICA'S

"RAciAL" CRISIS x-xi (1997). I find his critique persuasive but do not wish in this essay to
carry the baggage associated with bucking this particular set convention.
2. Much of the current debate over race can be characterized as one over optimism
versus pessimism about our progress toward racial equality. The pessimistic view is

perhaps most starkly expressed in ANDREw HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHTE,
See also DAvID SHiPLER, A COUNTRY OF
SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL (1992).
STRANGERS: BLACKS AND WHITES IN AMERICA (1997); DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A.
DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 60-82

(1993). Much more optimistic assessments are found in STEPHAN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL
THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK AND WH1TE: ONE NATION, INDIVISIBLE (1997), and
PATTERSON, supra note 1. All of these major studies agree that there remains a serious
racial divide, both in socioeconomic conditions and in attitudes; however, they disagree
over the direction and scope of progress in recent decades. Clearly, there are major
differences between black and white attitudes and beliefs about race.
3. Indeed, the racial divide is particularly manifest in different perceptions about the
nature and seriousness of racial divisions and about appropriate measures to deal with these
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perhaps, in part, the medium is itself the message, or the means itself the
end. We would do much to heal racial divisions if people of different
races, and particularly black and white citizens, had more conversationsabout race and, perhaps more importantly, not about race-with each
other. A "national conversation about race" may ultimately do less to
improve race relations in this country than would millions of individual
conversations among people of different races.
But where are those conversations to take place?
We live in a society that is still largely divided along racial lines,
especially with respect to black and white citizens.! In spite of important
progress toward desegregation, and particularly the dismantling of official
barriers to integration, there continues to be significant racial separation in
most spaces in our society. Even in areas with a significant black
population, most citizens still live in neighborhoods that are occupied
predominantly by people of their own race." Largely as a result of housing
issues. Public opinion data consistently show, for example, that "there is a massive gap
dividing black and white perceptions of the prevailing racial climate." Lee Sigelman &
Susan Welch, The Contact Hypothesis Revisited: Black-White Interaction and Positive
Racial Attitudes, 71 Soc. FORCES 781, 786 (1993). There are also wide differences in
perceptions and opinions on issues of social policy that have a differential impact on blacks
and whites.
4. The problems of segregation, racial inequality, and racial tension are greater with
respect to African-Americans than any other group. Moreover, the most extensive data on
segregation concerns black and white citizens. To the extent that I focus on this particular
divide, it is because it seems to present the most difficult problems.
5. Assessments of residential segregation consist of both hard statistical measures of
racial separation and isolation and polling data in which respondents report having
neighbors of other races. By hard statistical measures, residential segregation has declined,
but it continues to be significant. Massey and Denton found that in 18 northern major
metropolitan areas, the average black resident lived in a neighborhood (defined as a census
tract) that was 68.7% black in 1970 and 66.1% black in 1980. See MASSEY & DENTON,
supra note 2, at 64. For southern metropolitan areas, the figure declined from 69.3% in
1970 to 63.5%. See id. By 1990, across 318 metropolitan areas, the average black person
lived in a neighborhood that was 60% black and 29% white. See THERNSTROM &
THERNSTROM, supra note 2, at 219.
Another standard measure of segregation is the "dissimilarity index": the average
percent of residents who would have to move in order to achieve an even distribution of the
races throughout a metropolitan area. By that measure, Massey and Denton found that
"dissimilarity" had declined in the 18 largest northern metropolitan areas from 84.5% in
1970 to 80.1% in 1980 to 77.8% in 1990. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 2, at 64, 222.
In the 12 largest southern metropolitan areas, "dissimilarity" declined from 75.3% in 1970
to 68.3% in 1980 to 66.5% in 1990. See id.; see also Reynolds Farley & William H. Frey,
Changes in the Segregationof Whites from Blacks During the 1980s: Small Steps Toward a
More IntegratedSociety, 59 AM. Soc. REv. 23, 30-32 (1994) (showing modest declines in
black-white residential segregation during the 1980s). Levels of segregation and isolation
for other large minority groups, such as Hispanics and Asians, have consistently been much
lower. See id. at 32.
Polling data supply another softer measure of segregation.
In the Detroit
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segregation, most public schools, even in areas with substantial black
populations, are still attended predominantly by children of one race;
indeed, it seems likely that racial segregation in public schools will
increase in the near future, as the courts withdraw from the business of
school desegregation. 6 Churches tend to be attended mostly by one race or

another.7 Perhaps least surprising, racially mixed families, though far
more common than they once were, are still a rarity.8
Racial separation in many of these spheres has proven quite durable
and resistant to change through legal intervention. In some cases, as with
families, churches, and many other voluntary associations, deeply rooted
rights of privacy and freedom of association guard against attempts to
dictate desegregation, or even nondiscrimination. 9 In the crucial case of
housing, the racial makeup of neighborhoods is typically the product of
such complex and historically rooted forces, and of so many individual
decisions over a long period of time, that laws against housing
discrimination have made limited progress in changing overall patterns of
segregation. '°
metropolitan area in 1992, 89% of black respondents and 70% of white respondents
indicated that at least one family of the opposite race lived in their neighborhood. See Lee
Sigelman et al., Making Contact? Black-White SocialInteraction in an Urban Setting, 101
AM. J. Soc. 1306, 1311 (1996). In national polls, the percentage of black respondents
reporting that members of another race live in their neighborhood had risen from 66% in
1964 to 83% in 1994; for whites the increase has been more dramatic, from 20% in 1964 to
61% in 1994. See THERNsTRoM & THERNSTROM, supra note 2, at 219. On the other hand,
in the Detroit poll, only 26% of black respondents and 13% of whites claimed to have more
than a few neighbors of the opposite race. See Sigelman et al., supra at 1312. Only 8% of
black respondents and 5% of white respondents reported that they had ever visited the
homes of neighbors of the other race. See id. at 1311. Sixty-six percent of whites and 57%
of blacks who had some neighbors of the opposite race "hardly knew" those neighbors. See
id. at 1312.
6. See GARY ORFELD ET AL., DIsMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REvERSAL OF
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 53-71 (1996). Orfield and Eaton report that urban public
schools are now more racially imbalanced than they were prior to 1971, when the Supreme
Court in Sivann v. Charlotte-MecklenburgBd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971), authorized the
use of busing to achieve school desegregation. See ORFiELD ET AL., supra at 53-55. At the
same time, federal courts are becoming increasingly reluctant to enforce desegregation on
the ground that school districts have achieved "unitary" status-i.e., that the districts have
eliminated vestiges of past intentional segregation-notwithstanding the fact that a
significant degree of de facto resegregation would certainly result from the return to
neighborhood schools. See Davison M. Douglas, The End of Busing?, 95 MICH. L. REV.
1715, 1722-24 (1997) (reviewing ORFiELD ET AL., supra). As a result, racial isolation of
black schoolchildren in many districts is likely to increase. See id. at 1724.
7. See PATTERSON,supra note 1, at 198-99.
8. See id. at 70.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 31-39.
10. There is much controversy over the causes of continuing patterns of residential
segregation. Massey and Denton argue strongly for the predominance of racial factors over
economic class. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 2, at 83-113. In particular, they stress
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In several arenas, however, recent decades have brought greater
progress toward integration. One is the military." Another is higher
education, in which legal pressures and voluntary integration efforts have
dramatically changed the ethnic composition of student bodies on many
campuses.' These are important successes, but necessarily limited in their
impact on race relations in society at large. The military touches a
relatively small portion of the population and, for many, during only a
limited period of time. Higher education also occupies a fairly short phase
of life for most of those who enjoy its privileges. Racial integration in
these spheres of life is very important, and where it is threatened, as in the
case of higher education, it calls for a vigorous defense.'3
But the workplace is perhaps the most important sphere in which
significant integration has taken place. A combination of legal pressures,
primarily driven by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and
voluntary efforts have made the workplace an arena of comparative
integration.' 4 Moreover, it is an arena in which individuals interact on a
the propensity of white homebuyers to move out of areas with significant black populations,
see id. at 88-96, and the discriminatory practices of real estate agents and mortgage lenders,
see id. at 96-109. Black homebuyers overwhelmingly prefer to live in integrated
neighborhoods and typically prefer about a 50-50 mix; whites are increasingly willing to
live in "integrated" neighborhoods, but they tend to define the desirable level of integration
as about 80% white. See THERNSTROM & THERNSTROM, supra note 2, at 229. White
attitudes toward residential integration, in particular, have improved significantly since the
1970s, but most whites still avoid the levels of integration that blacks find most attractive.
See id.
11. The comparative success of racial integration of the armed forces is recounted in
depth in CHARLES C. MosKos & JoHN SIBLEY BUTLER, ALL THAT WE CAN BE: BLACK
LEADERSHIP AND RACIAL INTEGRATION THE ARMY WAY (1996).
12. See THERNSTROM & THERNSTROM, supra note 2, at 389-91.
13. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996) (barring all racial preferences
in University and Law School admissions absent a recent history of discrimination by the
University itself); Brief for Amicus Curiae Charles Alan Wright, Douglas Laycock, and
Samuel Issacharoff, in Taxman v. Board of Educ. of Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547, 1562 (3d
Cir. 1996) (defending the need for affirmative action in higher education), cert. grantedsub
nom Piscataway Twp. Bd. of Educ. v. Taxman, 117 S. Ct. 2506 (1997), cert. dismissed, 118
S. Ct. 595 (1997).
14. There has been significantly increased representation of non-whites (and women) in
higher paid jobs following the enactment of Title VII. See generally HERBERT
HAMMERMAN, A DECADE OF OPPORTUNITY: AFFRMATIVE ACrbON IN THE 1970s 5-9 (1984)
(summarizing finding). These findings held in all employment sectors studied, including
private and public sectors, unionized craft jobs, and higher education. See id. at 5. Thus,
between 1970 and 1980, minorities made significant gains in representation in categories of
officials and managers, professionals, technicians, sales jobs, clerical jobs, and craft jobs.
See id. at 40. These gains have continued. For example, between 1983 and 1996, black
employees increased their share of "managerial and professional" jobs from 5.6% to 7.4%;
of "technical, sales and administrative support" jobs from 7.6% to 10.3%; and of "precision
production, craft, and repair jobs," or skilled trades, from 6.8% to 7.9%. See U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF Tfm UNrrED STATES 410-12 (1997) [hereinafter 1997
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daily basis, often over years, within a common enterprise which
necessitates, to varying degrees, trust and cooperation. The workplace is
thus one of the very few settings in which adults spend a significant
amount of time interacting intensively and constructively with others from
different families, different neighborhoods, different religions, and,
importantly, different racial and ethnic groups.
It is important not to overstate the success of workplace integration.
African-American and Latino workers, in particular, remain
disproportionately concentrated in low-paid and unskilled jobs. 5 One of
the implications I draw from the role of the workplace in a racially diverse
democratic society is the importance of continued efforts to integrate
workplaces generally and, in particular, the higher levels of the workplace
hierarchy. But it is in part the degree of progress so far that suggests that
these continued efforts are likely to be worthwhile. I will argue here that
one of the best things this society could do to promote racial cooperation
and integration is to shore up and reinforce the ability of some critical
sectors of society-in particular, the workplace-to serve as arenas of
racially integrated discourse and constructive interaction.
In Part I of this essay, I hope to draw a convincing portrait of the
workplace as a uniquely important forum for personal interaction across
racial and ethnic lines. This is a portrait I have sketched before; 6 here, in
Part II, I add some empirical support to that picture. I will discuss some of
the ways in which labor and employment law does and could better
support the integrative function of the workplace. It is important to note
that the present essay offers only a preliminary sketch of some rather farreaching implications. The overall conclusion that is beginning to emerge,
but that clearly requires further development, is that many of the basic
constitutive elements of a democratic society-freedom of expression,
equal protection, due process, and even democratic governance itselfSTATISTICAL ABSTRACT].

Both class action litigation and affirmative action programs, including those instituted
in response to federal contract requirements, appear to have been major factors in securing
these advancements. See HAMMERMAN, supra at 5. This is indicated in part by the greater
progress seen among federal contractors. See id.

15.

See FEDERAL GLASS CEILING COMM'N, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, GOOD FOR BuSINEsS:

MAKING FULL USE OF THE NATION'S HUMAN CAPrrAL 12 (1995). For example, among the
occupations in which black employees were significantly overrepresented relative to the
proportion of the work force (10.7%) are service occupations, where they make up 17.2%
of the workers, particularly nurses' aides and orderlies (33.2%) and cleaning and building
services (22.8%). See 1997 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 14, at 412. Hispanic
workers, who make up 9.2% of the work force, are also significantly overrepresented
among service occupations (13.7%), especially private household workers (26.2%), maids
and janitors (19.6%), and farm workers (37.3%).
16. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Freedom of Expression in the Workplace and the Problem
of DiscriminatoryHarassment,75 TEx. L. REV. 687 (1997).

54

U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW

[Vol. 1:1

have important functions within the workplace that have been
underappreciated. These democratic elements help to support and enhance
the role of the workplace as a crucial arena of constructive interracial
engagement.
I.

THE WORKPLACE AS A FORUM FOR CONSTRUCTIVE INTERRACIAL
ENGAGEMENT

The workplace serves as an important intermediate institution in
society. 7 It mediates between individuals and society as a whole, and it
affords a space in which individuals cultivate some of the values, habits,
and traits that carry over to their broader roles as citizens.'s The workplace
is one of the few organic communities of a human scale in which many
members of society participate on a regular basis. As neighborhoods,
families, and other intermediate communities and institutions, such as
religious congregations, are battered and destabilized by the pressures of
economic change and geographic mobility, the role of the workplace has
become increasingly important in mediating between the individual and
the larger society and in cultivating "civic virtues," the habits, traits, and
beliefs that make good citizens.' 9
17. To characterize the workplace as an intermediate institution is to finesse an
ambiguity in the literature. For many writers following Tocqueville, the workplace does
not fit the classic profile of the intermediate institution because it is not a purely "voluntary
association" and is an integral component of both labor and product markets. See, e.g.,
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1713, 1715 (1988). The
economic marketplace is part of the remote and heartless large-scale societygesellschaft-thatmakes intermediate institutions so necessary. Yet while the workplace is
obviously subject to economic and legal constraints to which many purely voluntary
associations are not, it is more than a creature of the market. See infra text accompanying
note 40. For Emile Durkheim, "occupational groups" of workers within firms were the
ideal groups for bridging the increasing gap between the individual and social life. See
EMILE DURKHEIm, SUICIDE: A STUDY IN SOCIOLOGY 378-82 (George Simpson ed. & John
Spaulding & George Simpson trans., 1951). This split is explored somewhat further in
Estlund, supra note 16, at 727-28.
18. For a discussion of the importance of intermediate institutions as "schools of
democracy," see ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 1 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 61 (Phillips Bradley
ed. & Francis Bowen trans., 1945).
19. See Stanley Ingber, Rediscovering the Communal Worth of Individual Rights: The
First Amendment in Institutional Contexts, 69 Tax. L. REv. 1, 53-54 (1990) ("[The
structure of experience within intermediary institutions is fundamental to the establishment
of a free society .... "); Thomas C. Kohler, Individualism and Communitarianismat Work,
BYU L. REV. 727, 731-40 (1993) (observing that unions, in conjunction with other
mediating institutions of American democracy, require and can instill the habits of decision,
commitment, self-rule, and direct responsibility); Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97
YALE L.J. 1493, 1531 (1988) (identifying the workplace as one of the many areas where the
self-revisionary, dialogic engagement that underpins republican citizenship takes place);
Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1578 (1988)
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In a society that is still struggling with racial division and separation,
this mediating role has particular urgency. At work, and often nowhere
else in their lives, adults regularly interact with others from diverse
cultural, ethnic, and racial groups, working constructively toward common
aims. The workplace is thus a crucial site for the forging of personal ties
across lines that normally divide people-ties that help bind together a
diverse society.
This picture of the workplace community is admittedly idealized.
First, it understates the extent to which the workplace itself has suffered
destabilization and fragmentation2
The substitution of "contingent
workers" for full-time employees threatens to make workplace
relationships far more transitory and fragile;2' the growth of information
technology that enables remote production and transmission of work
product is making the very idea of a workplace anachronistic for some.2
These developments pose a serious threat not only to the economic wellbeing of many citizens, but also to the ability of the workplace to fulfill its
mediating role.
Second, this portrait obscures the instrumental and hierarchical nature
of the typical workplace. The hierarchical structure of many organizations
limits employee freedom of action and interaction, and particularly
constrains interaction among managerial, professional, skilled, and
unskilled segments of the work force. At least until robust forms of
employee participation become widespread, aspirations for freedom and
equality at work may appear fanciful.23
This idealized portrait also obscures the extent to which the
workplace, like other intermediate institutions, can become an enclave of
(remarking on the promise of workplace democracy as an outlet for self-determination).
20. See generally Kohler, supra note 19, at 735 ("The American work-life sphere has
not been insulated from the trends toward fragmentation that have affected the other
institutions of civil life.").
21.

See COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, U.S. DEP'T

OF LABOR & U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FACT FINDING REPORT 21-22 (1994) [hereinafter
FACT FINDING REPORT]. For an excellent journalistic treatment of the erosion of workplace

stability and security, see The Downsizing of America, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3-9, 1996
(exploring the changing nature of the modem workplace in a front-page series).
22. See generally JEREMY RIFIN, THE END OF WORK: THE DECLINE OF THE GLOBAL
LABOR FORCE AND THE DAWN OF THE POsT-MARKET ERA (1995). Indeed, as his title
suggests, Rifkin forecasts a more drastic decline of available work in the modem world. He
foresees a dramatic shrinkage of the demand for labor as the service sector undergoes the
same process of technological change experienced by agriculture and industry. See id. at
109-62. His primary prescriptions-a mandatory reduction in the normal workday and the
expansion of the "social sector" of voluntary and charitable organizations-would entail a
greatly reduced but still important role for work and workplace interaction in the "postmarket" era. See id. at 221-93.
23. I take up briefly below the issue of workplace democracy and its relation to the
mediating role of the workplace. See infra p. 58.
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intolerance, exclusion, provinciality, and prejudice on the basis of race,
sex, religion, and other salient lines of social division. But that is a
problem that we have attacked, with considerable success, through the law.
Title VII seeks to banish from the workplace private discrimination on the
basis of race, sex, religion, and nationality, much as the Constitution does
between the state and citizens. While the antidiscrimination mandate 4
does not reach all private institutions in the society, its extension to the
workplace, and particularly the prohibition in hiring, firing, and
promotions, is virtually uncontested2 It is worth pausing briefly to
consider why this is so.
One of the epic legal developments of the twentieth century is the
emergence of the equality principle and its extension into a growing circle
of public and private institutions, including some of the classic
intermediate institutions. The equality principle is mandated by the
Constitution in public institutions, including schools, employment,
housing, and public services," and by statute in much of the private sector,
including workplaces, educational institutions, places of public
accommodation, such as hotels and restaurants, and the housing market.7
Some proprietors of such institutions argued that these laws violated
countervailing constitutional rights of private property, freedom of
association, and privacy. 28 Their arguments were unsuccessful, however,
and are rarely echoed today."
Currently, public support for equal
opportunity in employment is nearly universal."
The result was different with respect to other associations such as the
family, religious institutions, political associations, private clubs, and
24. In calling Title VII an "antidiscrimination mandate," I am glossing over the
important question of the extent to which Title VII does or should permit "affirmative
action" in employment. I will take up that question below. See infrapp. 63-71.
25. For one of the few academic critiques of this extension, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992).
26. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (schools); Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (public employment); Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467 (9th Cir.
1988) (public housing); Dowdell v. Apopka, 698 F.2d 1181 (11th Cir. 1983) (public
services).
27. See Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994) (equal
employment); Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (education); Title II, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (fair
housing); Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (fair housing).
28. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 244 (1964)
(upholding equality in public accommodations under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 despite
the proprietor's argument that the statute effected a taking by depriving him of the right to
run his businesses and choose his customers as he wished).
29. But see EPSTEIN, supra note 25, at 262-63 (arguing for repeal of antidiscrimination
laws restricting private contracts).
30. In one 1972 poll, for example, 97% of white respondents said that they believed
blacks should have equal opportunities in employment. See TIERNSTROM & THERNSTROM,
supra note 2, at 500.
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fraternal organizations. The limits of the equality principle in these
institutions derive from a variety of sources: the state action doctrine,
limits on congressional powers or the willingness to exercise them, and
countervailing constitutional rights' Some of these institutions function
as enclaves of liberty and are constitutionally immune from laws
promoting equality. 32 Just as the First Amendment protects many public
expressions of intolerance, it also shields some intermediate institutions
from government intervention aimed at furthering equality and allows
them, in the name of liberty and freedom of association, to cultivate
intolerance.
Both the extension and the limits of the equality principle suggest a
judgment by legal and political actors about the role of various
intermediate institutions in our democratic society. The fullest judicial
articulation of these judgments is found in Roberts v. United States
Jaycees,33 in which the Court upheld application of a state
nondiscrimination statute to a large private club that excluded women and
rejected the club's freedom of association claim. In Roberts, the Court
delineated two strains of the freedom of association protected by the
Constitution: freedom of intimate association, protected for its intrinsic
value "as a fundamental element of personal liberty," and freedom of
expressive association, protected for its instrumental value
"as an
'
indispensable means of preserving other individual liberties."
As to the freedom of intimate association, the Court explained that
"certain kinds of personal bonds have played a critical role in the culture
and traditions of the Nation by cultivating and transmitting shared ideals
and beliefs; they thereby foster diversity and act as critical buffers between
the individual and the power of the state."3 The majority located the
workplace, by way of contrast, at the other end of the "spectrum from the
most intimate to the most attenuated of personal attachments., 36 The Court
noted that "the Constitution undoubtedly imposes constraints on the
State's power to control the selection of one's spouse that would not apply

31. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984).
32. See Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of
Conscience:The ConstitutionalBasisfor ProtectingReligious Conduct, 61 U. Cm-.L. REV.
1245, 1248-49 (1994) (explaining that religious groups seem to receive constitutional
protection from state control); Douglas Laycock, Towardsa General Theory of the Religion
Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81
COLUM. L. REv. 1373, 1377 (1981).
33. 468 U.S. 609.
34. Id. at 628.
35. Id. at 618-19 (citations omitted).
36. Id. at 620 (citing Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 187-89 (1976) (Powell, J.,
concurring)).
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to regulations affecting the choice of one's fellow employees." 37
As for the freedom of expressive association, the majority noted:
"according protection to collective effort on behalf of shared goals is
especially important in preserving political and cultural diversity and in
shielding dissident expression from suppression by the majority. 38 But it
is collective effort in support of shared political, social, and cultural values
and beliefs, not in support of shared economic objectives, that triggers
these concerns in the Roberts analysis. Therefore, the typical workplace, as
opposed to some religious and perhaps ideological employers, cannot
claim the freedom of expressive association as a shield against the
antidiscrimination mandate.39
The propriety of banning invidious discrimination in employment
draws broad support from the Constitution, legal culture, and the popular
will. However, it is a mistake to regard the workplace as a locus of wholly
instrumental, market-driven behavior and relationships. While workplace
relationships generally begin as "the most attenuated of personal
attachments," 40 they often become something more. The workplace
spawns conversations, alliances, and friendships among individuals who
would have no other point of connection-bonds that transcend family,
neighborhood, and often, given the partial success of Title VII, racial and
ethnic identity. The importance of these connections in a diverse but still
divided society cannot be gainsaid.
Title VII and its limited gains have transformed the workplace into a
particular and unique kind of mediating institution. The workplace best
performs its mediating function not by "cultivating and transmitting shared
ideals and beliefs' ' among intimate associates, free from the intrusion of
societal norms, but rather by convening strangers from diverse
backgrounds and inducing them to work together toward shared objectives
under the aegis of the equality principle. The workplace brings people
together in a face-to-face laboratory of diversity, a microcosmic society
that is subject to some of the same basic democratic constraints that govern
society as a whole.

37. Id. (citing Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 93-94 (1945)).
38. Id. at 622.
39. Cf. Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 32, at 1311-12 (contrasting economic
organizations with religious and other organizations animated by goals of intimacy, shared
understanding, personal growth, or salvation).
40. Roberts,468 U.S. at 620.
41. Id. at 618.
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SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF THE INTEGRATIVE ROLE OF THE
WORKPLACE

Thus far, I have drawn a highly idealized picture of the workplace and
its potential role as a vanguard of integration in a racially diverse but stilltoo-segregated society. This essay is not the place for a survey of
empirical evidence on this matter, but some data may be useful to carry
skeptical readers to the next step.42
Increasingly since World War II, and particularly since the enactment
of Title VII, whites and non-whites work side-by-side. This is especially
true in public employment and among large private-sector employers that
are most subject to governmental and judicial oversight in the form of
federal contract requirements and large-scale litigation. 43 As a result, there
is a considerable degree of interracial contact in the workplace, at least
among working adults in areas with significant black populations. In one
major study of the Detroit area, interracial conversations on the job were
by far the most common occasion for interracial contact. 44 Indeed,
[flor many white suburbanites and black city dwellers, work may
be the main or even the only site of regular contact with
members of the other race, whether as coworkers, customers,
bosses, or employees .... Moreover, work-based relationships
can, over the course of time, be transformed into social
relationships and even enduring friendships. 4
What good comes from these interracial contacts? The answer may
seem obvious: interracial interaction, and especially friendship, is
intrinsically good in a racially diverse society like ours. But this
seemingly obvious proposition has been the object of extensive inquiry by
social scientists.
A leading early theory of prejudice posited that negative stereotypes
and hostility toward other racial groups flourished in ignorance and that
close contact between members of different races improved racial
understanding."' Segregation was thus as much the cause as the result of
42. The focus in this section-as it is to a lesser extent throughout this essay-is on
relations between black and white citizens. That is because, first, the most significant racial
tensions and divisions in modem society-and the most deeply rooted in American
history-are those between black and white citizens. Second, there is much more empirical
data on black-white interaction and separation than on other intergroup relations.
43. See HAmERMAN, supra note 14, at 5-9. The proportion of minorities in jobs that
require a high level of education remains much smaller, though still increasing along with
the growing numbers of minorities obtaining college and advanced degrees. See id. at 8-9.
44. See Sigelman et al., supra note 5, at 1314.
45. Id. at 1315.
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racial tension and division. The "contact hypothesis" set some conditions
for positive racial interaction:
First, the contact should not take place within a competitive
context. Second, the contact must be sustained rather than
episodic. Third, the contact must be personal, informal, and oneto-one. Fourth, the contact should have the approval of any
relevant authorities. Finally, the setting in which the contact
occurs must confer equal status on both parties rather than
duplicate the racial status differential. 47
Needless to say, "[m]uch interracial contact does not meet these
conditions., 41 On the other hand, a good deal of on-the-job contact does
appear to meet the basic conditions for positive interracial contact: it is
generally cooperative rather than competitive;49 it is sustained and often
personal, informal, and one-to-one; it has the approval of managers and is
often, though not always, in a context of equal status. Moreover, as
observed above, interracial contacts on the job-because they are ongoing
and frequent-can lead to "social relationships and even enduring
friendships,"' in which the specified conditions for positive interracial
contact are even more fully met.
The data does support the unsurprising proposition that interracial
proximity is associated with interracial interaction. 5' That relationship is
particularly strong in the case of workplace proximity. Working in a
racially mixed workplace is associated with more significant interracial
interactions-and, in particular, with the formation of interracial
47. Mary R. Jackman & Marie Crane, "Some of my best friends are black...":
InterracialFriendshipand Whites' Racial Attitudes, 50 PuB. OPIN. Q. 459, 461 (1986); cf.
THOMAS F. PETTIGREW, RACIALLY SEPARATE OR TOGETHER? 275 (1971) ("Prejudice is
lessed when two groups (1) possess equal status, (2) seek common goals, (3) are
comparatively dependent upon each other, and (4) interact with the positive support of
authorities, laws, or customs."). See generally H.D. FORBES, ETHNIC CONFLIcr 22-24
(1997) (summarizing contact theory literature on the types of contact situations that reduce
prejudice).
48. Id. Even some contact that does appear to meet the specified conditions has failed
to yield consistently positive results in terms of racial attitudes. In particular, studies of the
racial attitudes of schoolchildren in desegregated schools have yielded mixed results. See
id. In part, I believe these results may point to a complicated relationship between racial
orthodox thought on racial hierarchy and integration (which has shifted dramatically since
the 1940s and 1950s toward racial equality), conscious racial attitudes (which in the
absence of interracial experience may tend simply to reflect the prevailing orthodoxy), and
interracial contacts (which may, like any interpersonal contacts, be both positive and
negative). But this relationship is far too complex to explore in the present abbreviated
context.
49. This assertion will bear closer examination below. See infra text accompanying
notes 52-61.
50. Sigelman, et al., supra note 5, at 1315.
51. See id. at 1315-18 (presenting results and summarizing other studies).
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friendships-than is, for example, living in a racially mixed
neighborhood. 52
However, the contact hypothesis goes further and posits that
interracial contact of the specified sort has a positive effect on racial
attitudes, on the demise of negative stereotypes, and on support for racial
integration and equality. Has this aspect of the contact hypothesis been
born out by the research? In general, the evidence suggests that significant
interracial contacts among adults do, in fact, tend to be associated with
more positive attitudes toward the other race.53 In particular, a variety of
significant and ongoing contacts between black and white adults of similar
status tend to be associated with more positive beliefs and feelings of
affinity toward members of the other race.'
It is important to note that these positive effects do not come out of
discussions about race, racial attitudes, or race relations. They come out of
ordinary, day-to-day social interaction in the context of common interests
and experiences. The contact hypothesis has been subjected to repeated
testing-some of which has yielded mixed results-and to serious
52. See Jackman & Crane, supra note 47, at 483-84. Whites who work in workplaces
with a high proportion of black co-workers are twelve times more likely to have a black
friend than are those with little workplace proximity to blacks, while whites who live in
neighborhoods with a high proportion of black neighbors are only six times more likely to
have a black friend than are those who do not live in proximity to blacks. See id. at 484.
Similarly, 60% of whites who live, and have lived in the past, in proximity to significant
numbers of black residents interact with their black neighbors; 80% of whites who work,
and have worked in the past, in workplaces with significant numbers of black co-workers
interact with those black co-workers. See id. at 483.
53. Sigelman and Welch acknowledge that prior empirical results had been mixed,
perhaps in part because the data was based on situations of forced interaction, very limited
interactions, artificially induced antagonisms, or other conditions that departed from the
desiderata of the contact hypothesis. See Sigelman & Welch, supra note 3, at 781-82.
Only when blacks and whites of more or less equal status shared a wide variety
of contacts did white hostility toward blacks abate-an idea that hearkened
back to Allport's original formulation but provided little basis for optimism,
since blacks and whites often have only minimal contact and typically do not
interact as social equals.
Id. at 782 (citing Jackman & Crane, supra note 47). In their own major and more recent
study, Sigelman and Welch:
consistently found that interracial friendships decrease blacks' perceptions of
racial hostility and that interracial neighborhood contacts decrease whites'
perceptions of hostility. Both interracial friendships and neighborhood contacts
increase whites' desire for racial integration ....
In some instances, the
positive effects of interracial contact are modest, but even these modest effects,
aggregated over millions of black and white Americans, have the potential to
ease the prevailing climate of race relations. And in some instances, the
positive effects of interracial contact are substantial.
Id. at 793.
54. See id.
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criticism.5 As a theory about ethnic conflict, it has limitations. Most
importantly, the contact theory is highly individualistic and tends to
underemphasize structural aspects of intergroup relations, power
51
differences, and genuinely conflicting interests. In a society such as ours,
it would be unduly optimistic, even pollyanna-ish, to suggest that the
answer to our racial troubles is more conversations, more cooperative
interaction, and more friendship across racial lines. I want to make a more
limited claim: more positive interracial interaction, while it is not the
answer to our racial troubles, is clearly a part of the answer and is in any
event intrinsically valuable.
The workplace is clearly one of the most important arenas of
constructive interracial engagement in our society, both because of the
amount of interracial interaction that takes place at work and because of
the conditions under which it often occurs. The future of race relations,
and the fate of our diverse society in this important respect, may depend to
a significant degree on the ability of the workplace to play this mediating
role among individuals who are otherwise separated along racial lines in
many spheres of life.
III. SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR THE LAW OF THE WORKPLACE

Supposing that the reader is convinced of the potential role of the
workplace in a racially diverse democracy, what follows? In particular,
what lessons are there for the law governing the workplace? I see a
number of important lessons for the law of workplace equality, for
workplace speech protections, for due process, and for democracy in the
workplace. For the moment, I will note only the rather obvious parallel
between these issues and some of the basic components of democratic selfgovernance. I hope the reasons behind the parallel will begin to emerge
even in the abbreviated discussion that follows.
A.

Implicationsfor Employment DiscriminationLaw

The foregoing portrait of the workplace and its role in a racially
diverse society suggests, at a minimum, that the existence of racially
integrated workplaces is a matter of critical societal importance. Racially
integrated workplaces are critical because they create arenas for continual,
constructive social interaction among individuals of different racial groups
in a society in which this is still too infrequent. Effective enforcement of
employment discrimination laws is thus a minimum condition of progress
55. See generally FORBES, supra note 47, at 14-41 (tracing the history of the contact
theory and its empirical testing).
56. See id. at 27-28.
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along these lines. But what should the employment discrimination laws
mean with regard to "affirmative action," or preferences in favor of
underrepresented racial minorities? I believe that society's powerful
interest in interracial engagement supports some, though not all, forms of
voluntary affirmative action.
Before elaborating on this claim, it is important to note that it differs
from those that are usually made in favor of affirmative action in
employment. The interracial engagement argument is not based on the
importance of expanding economic opportunities for disadvantaged
citizens, for it appeals to the interests of society as a whole, primarily
outside the economic sphere. The argument is not based on the need to
overcome the continuing effects of past discrimination, for it is forwardlooking and does not turn on the admittedly complex causes of widespread
de facto segregation. 7 The interracial engagement argument is also
different from arguments based on the goal of diversity, for it is founded
less on the salutory effects of diversity and difference within the particular
workplace than on the spillover effects in the society at large. My
argument is not about creating role models for achievement, for the
consequences it seeks are in the present generation. Nor is this an
argument about the need to serve particular job-related goals, such as
gaining credibility in the minority community, an argument often made in
support of integration of police forces.
The interracial engagement argument is not necessarily inconsistent
with any of these arguments, and it is not offered as an alternative. But it
is different. In a society that is tom by racial division and radical
disjunctures between attitudes, beliefs, and experiences, particularly of
black and white citizens, there is a compelling societal interest in creating
and maintaining spheres of real integration, in which citizens of different
racial identities are induced to interact constructively toward common
goals, to explore commonalties and differences, to break down stereotypes,
and to form personal bonds.
I want to emphasize, in particular, the difference between this claim
and the diversity argument, with which it might be confused. Proponents
of racial diversity argue that, in many contexts, an employer's ability to
accomplish its goals is enhanced by a diverse work force. Racial and
ethnic diversity is often viewed as a proxy for diversity of opinions,
experiences, and beliefs. In an otherwise overwhelmingly white work
force, minority employees introduce valuable differences into a setting of
comparative homogeneity. But the diversity argument has some serious
limitations. While there are undeniably group differences in attitudes and
57. Cf. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Comment, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's
Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 78, 80 (1986) (calling for a shift from
backward-looking, "sin-based" accounts of affirmative action to forward-looking accounts).
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experiences, it is awkward, to say the least, to assume that each individual
of another race carries those differences with her.58 The more
individualized the employment decision, the more possible and sensible it
may seem to make individual inquiries into the supposedly "diverse"
experiences and attitudes of the applicant, rather than to make assumptions
based on membership in a particular racial category. Moreover, it is far
from clear what the benefits of diversity are thought to be in many
workplaces and jobs. In jobs that primarily involve the application of
technical skills or physical abilities, the connection between diversity and
an enhanced work product or service is often hard to discern. Indeed, the
diversity argument has had rather little currency or judicial support outside
the educational context, where it is fortified by claims of academic
freedom in the selection of students and faculty. 59
By contrast, my claim does not turn on any contribution to the
employer's products or services, nor on any assumption that individuals
necessarily exhibit cultural or other group differences. The discovery of
common experiences, problems, attitudes, and attributes across racial lines
is at least as important as exposure to cultural differences. Further,
discovering common ground is important, not because it contributes to the
employer's product or service, but because it fosters the weaving together
of racial groups in society at large through the formation of individual
bonds of familiarity and friendship.
What follows from this claim? The argument posits some largely
overlooked societal benefits of racially integrated workplaces. To the
extent that affirmative action in employment helps to produce more
racially integrated workplaces, my argument adds another dimension to the
debate over whether affirmative action should be permissible under Title

58. The assumption that all members of a particular group share certain group attributes
and attitudes resembles just the sort of stereotyping that undermines interracial
understanding and communication. Deborah C. Malamud aptly expresses another aspect of
the problem:
The most conventional arguments for diversity are arguments that each member
of a group is a representative of that group's cultural characteristics and
viewpoints, and that the institution (or polity) is enriched by bringing these
different cultures under the institutional umbrella. The problem with these
arguments is that, as [K. Anthony] Appiah would suggest, they script the lives
of diversity hires. For example, the black college student who is a jazz
musician but switches to classical piano can be seen as ceasing to do his "job"
for the institution.
Deborah C. Malamud, Values, Symbols, and Facts in the Affirmative Action Debate, 95
MICH. L. REv. 1668, 1691 (1997) (book review).
59. See, e.g., Taxman v. Board of Educ. of Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547, 1561 (3d Cir.
1996) (distinguishing educational cases, and their reliance on diversity, under the Equal
Protection Clause as inapposite to the Title VII context).
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VII and the Constitutionf. Simply stated, it is one argument against a
purely color-blind model of employment discrimination law, and for
continuing to give some latitude to employment decisions that promote
racial integration within a particular workplace or a particular level of the
workplace hierarchy. But that is indeed too simple.
On the one hand, the compelling societal interest in creating arenas of
constructive interracial engagement extends more broadly than many other
interests asserted in support of affirmative action. It does not depend on
the particular employer's goals or business needs or record of past
discrimination, or on the particular nature of the job or the workplace.
Given the depth of the racial divide and its overshadowing importance in
the body politic, more constructive interracial engagement is better,
wherever it takes place.
The seeming limitlessness of my claim is bound to provoke an outcry
among those opposed to all forms of racial preferences. It may cause
jitters even among many who support affirmative action, but are concerned
about the institutionalization of racial categories and the social backlash
against racial preferences. Giving all employers in all circumstances carte
blanche to prefer minorities in hiring, promotions, or firing decisions is
hardly the order of the day and is unlikely to promote interracial
understanding.6' This is precisely the point. The societal interest in
60. Others have made similar arguments in support of workplace integration. Kathleen
Sullivan, for example, has written about the need to shift from a backward-looking, "sinbased" rationale for affirmative action, the need to "look forward rather than back,
justifying affirmative action as the architecture of a racially integrated future." Sullivan,
supra note 57, at 27. The forward-looking justifications have in common that they "aspire
to a racially integrated future, but none reduces to 'racial balancing for its own sake."' Id.
at 96. Similarly, Robin West, in her call for "a pragmatic liberalism," seeks to justify
"integration as a form of social organization," and to justify affirmative action as a useful
means of approaching that ideal. See Robin L. West, Liberalism Rediscovered: A
PragmaticDefinition of the Liberal Vision, 46 U. Prrr. L. REv. 673, 731-32 (1985); see
also Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status
Production and Race Discrimination,108 HARV. L. Rnv. 1003, 1082 (1995) ("The 'cross-

membership' effect of antidiscrimination laws provides a theoretical foundation for the
claim that affirmative action serves to combat discrimination more effectively than a mere
non-discrimination policy.").
61. Richard McAdams, who approaches the problem of racial hierarchy very
differently, recognizes that "the benefit of cross-membership"--a concept that overlaps
with my claims on behalf of "constructive interracial interaction"--might "justify a very
aggressive affirmative action program." Id. But he also recognizes some offsetting
tendencies: "Conversely, affirmative action creates a 'common fate' for those of the same
race and thus raises the salience of race. As critics of affirmative action have claimed, this
fact may cause whites to identify themselves more fully with their race." Id. (citation
omitted). He claims that "[a]ffirmative action likely has already had this effect, which
offsets the positive effects of cross-membership... [a]ffirmative action has, so far, done
little to integrate effectively American society." Id. I agree that affirmative action can have
some of these negative consequences and that the societal interest in fostering constructive
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constructive interracial engagement is not advanced by all forms of racial
preferences for underrepresented minorities. The interracial engagement
argument for affirmative action contains some important limits. I want to
sketch some of those limits without suggesting that this societal interest
can be translated into a fully operational standard for evaluating the
legality of a particular program of racial preferences under Title VII or
constitutional litigation.
First, the interest in fostering constructive interracial engagement in
integrated workplaces can support affirmative action only in workplaces,
or parts of the workplace, in which there is not already a significant degree
of integration. Mine is not an argument for proportional representation; it
does not justify preferences wherever there is less than proportional
representation of the preferred group in a particular job category. Second,
the interest in constructive interracial engagement cannot support-and
indeed would reject-racial preferences among incumbent co-workers that
impose a serious cost on identifiable individuals. Such preferences are
highly likely to engender interracial resentment rather than constructive
engagement. 2 So my argument tends to support the existing Supreme
Court stance: layoff preferences are rarely permissible while hiring
preferences are more often permissible under Title VI 63
More concretely, my claim here is not an argument for the kind of
preference that cost Sharon Taxman her job in Piscataway, New Jersey.6,
interracial interaction does not support unlimited affirmative action. But the contact theory
research provides at least some significant data to suggest that, on balance, workplace
integration, which is certainly partly a result of affirmative action efforts, tends to foster
interracial understanding and reduce hostility and negative stereotypes. See supra text
accompanying notes 52-53.
62. Recall one of the conditions for the "contact hypothesis" was that the contact not be
in a competitive context. See supra text accompanying note 47. The use of racial
preferences among incumbent co-workers seems likely to contribute to racial identification
and interracial competition. I want to make it clear that, in attending to white resentment as
a possible limiting condition on affirmative action, I am not suggesting that white
resentment or "backlash" is a permissible basis for limiting the enforcement of
antidiscrimination laws generally. Limiting the scope of remedial decrees in the school or
housing context because of anticipated white flight raises difficult issues that are quite
different from those discussed here. See Paul Gewirtz, Remedy and Resistance, 92 YALE
L.J. 585 (1983).
63. Compare United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 209 (1979) (upholding
under Title VII race-conscious hiring "designed to eliminate conspicuous racial imbalance
in traditionally segregated job categories") with Wygant v. Jackson Board of Educ., 476
U.S. 267, 283 (1986) (striking down race-conscious layoffs used to preserve diversity in
teaching faculty). As the Supreme Court stated in Wygant, "While hiring goals impose a
diffuse burden, often foreclosing only one of several opportunities, layoffs impose the
entire burden of achieving racial equality on particular individuals, often resulting in
serious disruption of their lives. That burden is too intrusive." Id. (citation omitted).
64. See Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1551 (describing the School Board's decision to use racial
preferences in its decision to layoff Sharon Taxman).
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The workplace there was already integrated, and would have remained so
if Taxman, instead of her black co-worker, had retained her job. 5 Indeed,
my argument tends to support the Third Circuit's decision to strike down
the preference in Taxman, which treated two incumbent co-workers
differently on the basis of their race and imposed a large cost on an
identifiable individual.66 Preferences in that context seem more likely to
undermine rather than foster the possibilities for constructive interracial
engagement.67 On the other hand, my argument is deeply at odds with the
Third Circuit's conclusion in Taxman that affirmative action is justified
8
only where it seeks to remedy the employer's own past discrimination,
My argument may tend to support the Supreme Court's decision in
Johnson v. TransportationAgency, 69 upholding the county's promotion of
Diane Joyce to a position in which no woman had previously served.
However, it may not. First, the argument presented here is premised upon
the relative infrequency of other occasions for interracial interaction
outside the workplace. This premise is not readily applicable to sex.7
65. See id. at 1550-51. The employer sought to rely on the fact that the faculty of the
Business Department, in which Taxman worked, was otherwise all white. See id. at 1551.
The Third Circuit gave little attention to this claim because it concluded-wrongly, I
think-that affirmative action could be justified only by the need to remedy the employer's
own past discrimination, which was absent in Taxman. See id. at 1563 ("The Board admits
that it did not act to remedy the effects of past discrimination."). But even in my broader
view of the legitimate interest in constructive interracial engagement, it is not clear that the
racially based layoff fostered this interest unless it could be shown that interaction among
teachers, or between teachers and students, was largely intradepartmental. Even if that were
true, the countervailing tendency of layoff preferences to exacerbate racial tensions among
co-workers would seem to offset this contribution.
66. See id. at 1564 ("[Tihe harm imposed upon a non-minority employee by the loss of
his or her job is so substantial and the cost so severe that the Board's goal of racial
diversity, even if legitimate under Title VII, may not be pursued in this particular
fashion.").
67. There is, in fact, anecdotal evidence to suggest that the race-based layoff (and of
course the surrounding litigation) in Taxman has contributed to interracial tensions within
the school district that had not previously surfaced. See Brett Pulley, A Reverse
DiscriminationSuit Upends Two Teachers' Lives, N.Y. TIMBS, Aug. 3, 1997, at Al.
68. See id. at 1557 ("[W]e are convinced that unless an affirmative action plan has a
remedial purpose, it cannot be said to mirror the purposes of the statute .....
69. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
70. On the other hand, one might make a parallel argument in the context of gender. In
a society in which much interaction between the sexes is in the context of sexual or family
relations-relations that may tend to perpetuate existing sex roles and sex stereotypes-and
in which there continues to be wide differences in experiences and attitudes between men
and women, it is important to foster the creation of peer relations across gender lines. The
workplace, as it is constructed by Title VII and sexual harassment doctrine, forces
individuals to interact with the opposite sex as co-workers and peers, thus contributing to
the erosion of sexual stereotypes and assumptions about male dominance and superiority.
However, this argument calls for development and examination in its own right and is not
an easy analogue to the argument for racial interaction presented here.
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Second, it is clear that preferences in promotions-because they treat coworkers differently on the basis of race or sex-may produce some of the
same counterproductive tensions and resentments as do preferences in
layoffs. Preferences among co-workers may tend to make racial identity
more salient and to cultivate interracial competition, not cooperation. On
the other hand, the goal of fostering arenas of constructive interracial
engagement is best served by having not only integrated work forces, but
also integrated layers of supervision and management. The evidence
suggests that contacts that are based on equal status, or on status that
inverts the prevailing racial hierarchy, are most likely to lead to more
positive racial attitudes and relations.7 Prohibiting all affirmative action
preferences in promotions in workplaces in which most supervisory and
managerial positions are filled through internal promotions may
dramatically stall the progress of integration.
Promotions thus present the most difficult case for my analysis, just
as they pose the most difficult problem in current affirmative action
jurisprudence.72 Current jurisprudence poses the question in terms of
whether the preference "unnecessarily trammels the interests" of the nonpreferred employees.7 3 That is a hard question, the answer to which may
be very context-specific with regard to promotions. Nothing in my
analysis here suggests that it is the wrong question, nor provides an easier
answer to that question. But it does support the "middle way" charted by
decisions like Johnson,74 as opposed to the rejection of racial preferences
in all contexts.
Thus, the scope of the argument is limited in at least two ways: first,
by the focus on "integration" rather than proportionality, and, second, by
the concern with minimizing race-conscious decisions among incumbent
co-workers. In addition, the argument implies limits on the extent to
which minority applicants should be preferred and on the magnitude of any
such preference even in hiring. Preferences that are very large and that
result in the hiring of individuals who are manifestly less qualified, even
though "qualified" in a threshold sense, do not necessarily contribute to the
interest in fostering constructive interracial interaction. Such preferences
are not necessarily wrong; they may sometimes be necessary to remedy
past discrimination. But the interest in creating spheres of integration is

71. See Jackman & Crane, supra note 47, at 476-79.
72. See Samuel Issacharoff, When Substance Mandates Procedure: Martin v. Wilks
and the Right of Vested Incumbents in Civil Rights Consent Decrees, 77 CORNELL L. REV.
189 (1992).
73. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 616.
74. Id. at 642 (upholding an affirmative action plan "that represents a moderate,
flexible, case-by-case approach to effecting a gradual improvement in the representation of
minorities").
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not clearly served by introducing manifestly less qualified minority
employees into the workplace.
Indeed, it seems very likely that integration that arises through simple
nondiscrimination and without racial considerations of any kind offers the
best chance for constructive interracial engagement. However, where
simple nondiscrimination has not resulted in significant racial integration,
I would argue that, on balance, modest racial preferences among qualified
applicants in hiring, and sometimes in promotions, advance the compelling
societal interest in creating opportunities for constructive interracial
engagement.
I might be accused of failing to follow my analysis through to its
logical conclusion in two respects. First, if creating arenas of constructive
interracial engagement is such a compelling societal interest, why does it
not justify mandatory rather than the voluntary affirmative action that I
have defended?75 The easy answer is that such a claim cannot be
reconciled with existing law, not to mention the current political climate.
But that is too facile a response. In fact, I believe that any sort of
nationwide legal mandate for affirmative action would itself polarize racial
attitudes and exacerbate interracial competition and suspicion. Forcing
affirmative action, in addition to nondiscrimination, on resistant and
resentful employers is likely to be counterproductive.7 6 Mandating
affirmative action would also eliminate the experimental and provisional
aspects of voluntary plans, which can be tested and modified in light of
experience, including experience with the interracial workplace
interactions that result. This feature of voluntary affirmative action serves
incidentally as a safety valve that keeps potentially destructive resentments
from building.
Second, the logic of my argument might seem to justify a preference
for white employees in workplaces or jobs that are overwhelmingly
occupied by minority employees. Would not the societal interest in
creating arenas of integration be served by preferring white applicants for
maintenance jobs, for example, that are currently filled almost exclusively
by black employees?
Such a preference might give those black
employees-many of whom live most of their lives in overwhelmingly
black neighborhoods-opportunities for constructive engagement with
whites. 7 But I do not believe such preferences would be justified.

75. By "mandatory affirmative action," I do not mean legal tests of discrimination,
such as "disparate impact" theory, that arguably induce employers to engage in affirmative
action in order to avoid liability and litigation.
76. Recall the claim that interracial contacts are likely to have positive effects where,
among other conditions, they "have the approval of relevant authorities." Jackman &
Crane, supra note 47, at 461.
77. This poses in the employment context a question taken up by courts in the housing
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Jobs that are overwhelmingly occupied by non-white employees are
almost invariably located at the bottom of the economic ladder. In these
situations, preferring a white applicant would tend to produce a more
integrated workplace, but only by denying a low-income and probably
unemployed minority applicant a toehold in the active labor force. Such
disadvantage cannot be justified under a statute whose primary objective is
to ensure equal economic opportunity to members of historically
disadvantaged minority groups. 78 Even at the hiring stage, the goal of
workplace integration cannot justify discrimination against members of
historically disadvantaged groups.
But if the purported goal of promoting constructive interracial
interaction falls away in the face of an overwhelmingly minority work
force and can never come to the aid of a white employee, is it anything
more than a make-weight in support of "reverse discrimination"? Is it,
after all, just a one-way ratchet-albeit a limited-purpose ratchet-in favor
of "benign preferences"? In a sense, that is right. Society's compelling
interest in creating arenas of constructive interracial engagement is one of
several reasons for maintaining an asymmetrical antidiscrimination
doctrine against an increasingly powerful political and legal onslaught.
Employment decisions that favor members of historically disadvantaged
groups are not always justified even though their goals are inclusion,
integration, and increased economic opportunity.
However, these
decisions are not of the same moral universe as discrimination that
disfavors the historically disfavored, perpetuating minority exclusion and
privileged white access to decent jobs and livelihoods.
Ultimately, the societal interest in creating arenas of constructive
interracial engagement may not be easily translated into an operational test
of the legality of particular affirmative action plans. This interest does not
fit neatly into an analysis that seeks to insure a close link between the
employer's objectives and the means chosen.
The promotion of
context. See United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 946 (1988). The case concerned a plan for maintaining a racially integrated lowincome housing complex by insuring that the percentage of minority occupants did not rise
above the point at which "white flight" and resegregation would result. See id. at 1098.
Due to the large number of minority applicants for public housing, qualified black
applicants waited up to ten times as long as white applicants for an apartment. See id. at
1099. The court held that the integration plan violated housing discrimination laws
notwithstanding its salutary goal of maintaining a racially integrated residential
environment. See id. at 1100-01. Indeed, the court so held even though housing integration
was among the express goals of the fair housing laws. See id. at 1101. The court
determined that the goal of housing integration could not justify this kind of ongoing
discrimination against minority applicants. See id. at 1102.
78. See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202-04 (1979) (noting that a
primary legislative purpose of Title VII was to open employment opportunities for black
citizens).

19981

RACIALLY DIVERSE SOCIETY

constructive interracial engagement operates at a more abstract level in the
debate: it is a reason to oppose legislation or referenda that ban all racial
preferences and to oppose judicial restriction of affirmative action to
narrowly remedial contexts. It is a reason to resist the use of racial
preferences among incumbent co-workers, particularly in the context of
layoffs. And it is a reason to regard with greater generosity and less
suspicion the motives of employers-public and private-who adopt
voluntary affirmative action plans. The societal interest in constructive
interracial engagement, like the interest in overcoming past societal
discrimination, may be too overarching to be useful in deciding particular
cases. But it is far too important to ignore in the current debate over
whether racial considerations in employment decisions are ever
permissible.
B.

Implicationsfor Freedom of Expression in the Workplace: On
DiscriminatoryHarassmentand ConcertedActivity

Racial integration within the workplace creates opportunities for
constructive engagement that benefit society as a whole. However, the
implications of my analysis are broader, for the law of the workplace
affects the conditions for constructive interracial engagement in a variety
of ways.
If the workplace is to serve effectively its important role in a racially
diverse democracy, employees must have some degree of freedom of
speech. People must feel reasonably free to speak their minds on what
matters to them; to exchange opinions, beliefs, and experiences with coworkers; and to identify commonalties and explore differences. For many

people, there is no other time or place in their lives in which they can talk
about public issues, personal problems, and spiritual concerns with
individuals from diverse backgrounds and perspectives. In particular, the

workplace is the only realm of life in which many people have regular and
constructive personal contact with individuals of another race. We have

seen that this sort of regular and constructive personal contact is crucial for
alleviating racial divisions.
There are two important dimensions to the legal status of freedom of
speech in the workplace. First, what constitutional constraints are there on
the government's regulation of workplace speech? The First Amendment
is relevant to employee speech in the private sector only in the rather
unusual case in which the government has purported to regulate employee
speech. That seemingly unusual case, in the form of discriminatory79
harassment law, has recently attracted a good deal of attention.

79. My discussion of the harassment problem is borrowed heavily from the fuller
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Ultimately more important, I think, is the second dimension of workplace
freedom of speech: legal protections against employer regulation or
suppression of employee speech.
I have written on both of these
dimensions at some length and will keep my comments here brief.
1.

The First Amendment and Hostile Environment Claims Under
Title VII

The constitutional dimension of employee free speech rights has been
put under a rare spotlight by the development of "hostile environment"
doctrine under Title VII." The theory is unexceptionable: the employer's
creation or toleration of a discriminatory hostile work environment is a
form of discrimination in terms and conditions of employment.
Constitutional questions arise, however, when the hostile environment
claim rests primarily or entirely on speech. The fear of liability, and now
of punitive damages, turns employers into government censors and poses a
serious threat to employee freedom of expression. This genuine First
Amendment question is rarely litigated, but deserves close attention. What
does the foregoing vision of the role of the workplace in a racially diverse
democratic society suggest about this controversy?
First, it calls for a more robust conception of the role of workplace
speech in the constitutional scheme. The workplace can and should serve

discussion in Esflund, supra note 16.
80. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Free Speech and Due Process in the Workplace, 71 IND.
L.J. 101 (1995).
81. The growing literature expresses a broad spectrum of views. Some argue that
virtually all regulation of verbal harassment violates the First Amendment. See, e.g.,
Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-EnvironmentHarassment and the
FirstAmendment, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 481 (1991); Larry Alexander, Banning Hate Speech and
the Sticks and Stones Defense, 13 CoNST. COMM. 71 (1996). Others, while critical of
harassment law on free speech grounds, allow for some regulation of speech under Title
VII. See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WoRDs: INDIvIDUALS, COMMUNITIES, AND
LIBERTIES OF SPEECH 77-96 (1995); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harassment, Content
Neutrality, and the FirstAmendment Dog That Didn't Bark, 1994 Sup. CT. REv. 1 (1995);
Eugene Volokh, How Harassment Law Restricts Free Speech, 47 RUTGERS L. REv. 563
(1995) [hereinafter Volokh, Harassment Law]; Eugene Volokh, Comment, Freedom of
Speech and Workplace Harassment,39 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1791 (1992) [hereinafter Volokh,
Freedom of Speech]; Nadine Strossen, Regulating Workplace Sexual Harassment and
Upholding the FirstAmendment-Avoiding a Collision, 37 VI!L. L. REv. 757 (1992). Still
others conclude that Title VII doctrine is entirely consistent with a proper understanding of
the First Amendment. See, e.g., CATHARINE MAcKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993); Suzanne
Sangree, Title VII ProhibitionsAgainst Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment and the
FirstAmendment: No Collision in Sight, 47 RUTGERS L. REv. 461 (1995); Mary Becker,
How Free Is Speech At Work?, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 815 (1996); Amy Horton, Comment,
Of Supervision, Centerfolds, and Censorship: Sexual Harassment, the First Amendment,
and the Contoursof Title VII, 46 U. MIAMI L. REv. 403 (1991).

1998]

RACIALLY DIVERSE SOCIETY

as a kind of satellite domain of public discourse. Freedom of speech
within the workplace plays a distinctive role in our society because the
workplace itself is a comparatively integrated site for face-to-face
interaction and cooperation. Co-workers must form working relationships
and cooperate toward common aims despite diverse backgrounds.
The convergence of diversity and close engagement makes the
workplace a unique intermediate institution and a crucial satellite domain
of public discourse.
But this same convergence of diversity and
engagement makes unconstrained speech potentially explosive.
Expression of hatred, contempt, or disrespect on the basis of race, sex,
religion, or the like may inflict greater harm within the workplace than in
the public square partly because of the close and ongoing personal
engagement that the workplace compels. Such expression burdens the
individual targets who must spend their working days, not a fleeting
encounter, in this environment. As a consequence, such expression may
undermine workplace equality and reinforce occupational segregation.
Such expression may also poison the workplace as a forum for pluralistic
exchange and destroy the possibility of constructive engagement. We
might, following
Robert Post, call this "the paradox of workplace
' 2
discourse.
Workplace diversity, enforced by the equality norm, constructs the
workplace as a uniquely valuable setting for speech and as an important
satellite forum for public discourse. The workplace can thus perform its
function within the system of freedom of expression and maintain its
unique role within a diverse society only if it is subject to some constraints
of equality, civility, tolerance, and respect that foster reasoned
deliberation. In other words, Title VII's restrictions on racial harassment,
tempered by limited First Amendment constraints, are an integral
component of constituting the workplace as an arena for constructive
interracial engagement.
These observations do not resolve the paradox of workplace
discourse, but they do call for a compromise between the no-holds-barred
libertarian approach, which essentially prevails in the core of public
discourse, and the approach embodied in current Title VII "hostile
environment" law, under which nearly any employee speech or conduct
that a complainant finds offensive may contribute to employer liability. 3

82. See ROBERT POST, CONsTrrUoNAL DOMAINs 119-78 (1995). I paraphrase,
recognizing that Professor Post would not extend the idea of public discourse into the
workplace at all. See Estlund, supra note 16, at 718-21.
83. See Eugene Volokh, What Speech Does "Hostile Work Environment" Harassment
Law Restrict?, 85 GEO. L.J. 627 (1997). This is not to suggest that it is easy to make out a
hostile environment claim. Nearly anything may contribute to a hostile environment, but
the standard for liability is quite stringent. The plaintiff must show that "the workplace is

74

U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW

[Vol. 1:1

As I have argued elsewhere, the First Amendment should permit the
government to impose certain constraints on the manner of expression,
though not on the subject matter or viewpoint expressed, in workplace
discourse. This compromise seeks both to recognize the importance of
workplace discourse in promoting constructive interracial engagement and
to give due weight to its distinctive nature and potential consequences.
2.

Making Common Cause in a Diverse Work Force: The NLRA's
Protections of Employee Speech

To enjoy any significant degree of freedom of expression, employees
need protection not only against government-sponsored censorship but,
more often, against employer censorship and retaliation against speech that
seems to, or does, threaten employer interests. In a sporadic way, the law
has come to recognize this need and to create a rudimentary system of
freedom of expression in the workplace in the form of a patchwork of legal
constraints against employer retaliation for various kinds of "protected"
speech.' There are, for example, a variety of statutory and common law
"whistleblower protections" that prohibit reprisal against employees who
make complaints, bring charges, or participate in proceedings under
various laws, including Title VII? But the single most sweeping legal
protection of employee speech in the private sector-and the most
important in the present context-is section 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA), which gives employees the right to engage in
"concerted activity for ... mutual aid or protection. 86
Section 7 of the NLRA applies not only to employees who are or seek
to be represented by a union, but to almost all private-sector employees
who act "in concert" with one or more co-workers on matters of shared
concern.' The NLRA is rarely invoked by, and largely unfamiliar to,

permeated with 'discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult' ... that is 'sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive
working environment."' Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (quoting
Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-67 (1986)). This does not resolve the
constitutional problem, however, because liability-conscious employers have little choice
but to ban all contributing speech and conduct; they cannot ban only that which threatens to
cross the threshold for hostile environment liability. See Volokh, HarassmentLaw, supra
note 81, at 567-68.
84. This "system of freedom of expression" is discussed in Estlund, supra note 16.
85. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(3).
86. 29 U.S.C. § 157.
87. For example, in Washington Aluminum Co. v. NLRB, 370 U.S. 9 (1962), the
Supreme Court held that section 7 protected seven nonunion workers who walked off the
job in protest of extremely cold temperatures in the workplace, and that their discharge thus
violated section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA. See id. at 17.
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nonunion employees outside the organizing context.88 However, section 7
extends to employees at least formal free speech rights on issues of
unionization and other forms of employee representation and on shared
work-related grievances."
This statutory right is hemmed in by many
limitations, including limitations on speech: some concerted expressive
activity is illegal under the federal labor laws; 9° some is subject to state
laws against trespass and libel;9' and some is unprotected under section 7 if
it is too disruptive of employer interests, as in the case of speech that
"disparages" the employer's product or service.9
On the other hand,
section 7 protects some rough, crude, and even abusive language inevitable
in the highly emotional context of labor disputes. 93
In some respects, the vision of employee speech rights in section 7 is
in tension with harassment law under Title VII. For example, crude and
insulting language may both represent part of a concerted effort by some
workers to advance their shared interests and contribute to racial or sexual
harassment. 94 One might resolve the conflict a bit formalistically by
claiming that the subsequent enactment of Title VII simply trumps any
conflicting manifestations of the older NLRA vision of workplace
88. Indeed, my own casual inquiries suggest that the protections that section 7 affords
nonunion employees are unfamiliar to almost all law students, including those beginning a
course in labor law, to most lawyers, and even to many lawyers who practice "employment
law." The NLRA is widely regarded as a world unto itself, one that deals strictly with
unions and collective bargaining.
89. See, e.g., Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 569-70 (1978) (holding that section
7 protects circulation of a newsletter urging support for the union and for an increase in the
minimum wage and opposition to a state right-to-work provision); Republic Aviation Corp.
v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945) (holding that employee solicitation of union activity on nonwork areas of employer property during non-work hours was protected under section 7);
Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 507 (1978) (holding that section 7 protected
employee circulation of union newsletter to co-workers in hospital cafeteria that was open
to patients).
90. See 29 U.S.C. § 8(b)(4); see, e.g., Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
(Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519.
91. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters,
436 U.S. 180, 202-03 (1978) (holding that union picketing of private property may be
subject to state trespass prosecution); Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 55
(1966) (holding that some concerted activity may be subject to state libel action).
92. See NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, Int'l Bd. of Elec. Workers, 346 U.S. 464,
466-67 (1953).
93. See Linn, 383 U.S. at 58 (stressing that because "[1]abor disputes are ordinarily
heated affairs.... [ilt is therefore necessary to determine whether libel actions in such
circumstances might interfere with national labor policy").
94. For example, this might occur where abuse is aimed at female or minority workers
who oppose the union, cross a picket line, or otherwise support management; at a female or
minority supervisor for conduct perceived as contrary to shared employee interest; or at a
female or minority rival for union office. See Bowman v. Heller, Civ. A. No. 90-3269,
1993 WL 761159 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 9, 1993) (holding that sexually explicit campaign
literature ridiculing female candidate for union office was harassment under state law).
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discourse. Given the already long list of exceptions to section 7 rights,
including the employer's recognized power under the NLRA to limit
workplace discourse where necessary to maintain "production or
discipline," 5 it requires no great departure to allow the employer to restrict
some workplace discourse---even that which would otherwise qualify for
section 7 protection-in order to maintain an atmosphere of tolerance and
equality.
However, the relationship between section 7 and Title VII is far more
complex, particularly in light of the goal of fostering constructive
interracial interaction. The protection of concerted activity within a
racially integrated work force is perhaps the single most direct support the
law can offer-beyond the fact of integration itself-to the role of the
workplace in a racially diverse society. It is imperative that we do not
lightly cast aside the NLRA's vision of employee solidarity and freedom
from employer interference as a thing of the past. We should instead seek
to reconcile that vision with the modem commitment to racial equality and
integration.
The original NLRA, the Wagner Act of 1935, assumed largely
homogeneous or racially segmented workplaces and did not aspire to
combat the widespread employment discrimination and occupational
segregation that produced that homogeneity or segmentation. On that
assumption, it was fair to conclude that removing the threat of employer
coercion and interference in worker activity would allow employees to
unite and assert their shared interests. Once Title VII prohibited
discrimination and segregation in employment, work forces became
increasingly heterogeneous: women entered previously all-male
workplaces, and minorities entered previously all-white workplaces. The
resulting diversity produced clashes among workers, often in the form of
racial and sexual harassment, that threatened to undermine not only
progress toward equality but also feelings of solidarity, shared values, and
common interests among workers. 6
Title VII's prohibition of
discriminatory harassment recognizes those divisions among employees
and calls upon the employer to intervene in the interest of equality for
minority groups, including women, within the newly diverse workplace.
However, the NLRA's vision of worker solidarity suggests that we
should be skeptical of the ability of employer intervention to cultivate
healthier workplace relations. Employer intervention on behalf of new
employees to protect them from co-worker harassment may instead
95. Republic Aviation Corp., 324 U.S. at 803.
96. Harassment often victimizes the pioneers-minorities or women-in a previously
all-white or all-male workplace. See Linda S. Greene, Sexual Harassment Law and the
First Amendment, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 729, 733-34 & n.30 (1995) (citing numerous
cases).
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engender resentment and hostility. Indeed, some have suggested that
taunting and verbal abuse of newcomers may sometimes be a "test,"
passage of which may lay the groundwork for a stronger sense of
community and acceptance and even more genuine social equality." Of
course, putting outsiders through this "test" can also cause tremendous
pain, interfere with work performance, cause employees to leave the job
and even the line of work, reinforce occupational segregation, and
undermine equal economic opportunity.
We can see the New Deal perspective as adding a new element to the
paradox of workplace discourse: unconstrained freedom of expression
within a diverse workplace threatens to destroy the preconditions for
rational and civil discourse, for workplace equality, and for solidarity and
effective collective action on behalf of shared employee interests. At the
same time, deputizing employers to constrain employee expression in
support of civility and equality necessarily limits the freedom of
interaction among employees and may engender divisions and undermine
interracial solidarity. Where a threat of discipline hangs over every clash
of opinion-and particularly where it hangs over some participants much
more heavily than others-it is hard to see how workers can form a
genuine community of interest.
The uneasy solution to this paradox, once again, lies in a compromise
between unconstrained freedom for potentially abusive speech and an
open-ended mandate for employer regulation of speech. Selective First
Amendment limits on Title VII harassment liability, such as those I have
proposed," remove some of the legal pressures on employers to censor
employee speech and give somewhat more room for the development of
employee solidarity through open communication.
The larger point is that the NLRA and its vision of employee
solidarity and concerted action should not be seen as a stumbling block to
97. My colleague Jack Getman has observed this dynamic in a number of unionized
workplaces in the early stages of integration of women or minorities or both. He suggests
that letting workers deal with these tensions among themselves often produces a real sense
of solidarity and community that may be undermined by introducing disciplinary sanctions
and litigation. Assuming that this is a common dynamic, there are several features of the
union workplace that may contribute to it. First, workers tend to stay in union workplaces
longer for various reasons; the stability of the work force may contribute to the ability to
work out tensions among workers. Second, unions depend on solidarity for their
effectiveness; this may contribute to the need to overcome hostility and tensions among
employees. Third, unions give employees a voice in workplace governance and in
developing rules governing employee behavior; this may open the door to more productive
ways of dealing with harassment. On the other hand, there are also many cases of egregious
harassment, with some degree of union protection, in union workplaces. See generally
Marion Crain, Women, Labor Unions, and Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment:
The Untold Story, 4 TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 9 (1995).

98. See Estlund, supra note 16, at 687.
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workplace equality and integration. On the contrary, even the NLRA's
limited promise of employee freedom of expression-freedom from
employer suppression of most speech among workers on matters of shared
concern-could be (if it were adequately enforced) a fundamental building
block of interracial cooperation and community within the workplace.
Many of the common concerns that can bring employees together in spite
of their differences may be grievances against the common employer.
Expression of those concerns, particularly if they become widespread, may
encounter employer resistance and sometimes reprisals or threatened
reprisals. Protecting concerted activity among employees in a diverse
work force-with the overlay of Title VII's provisions against
discrimination and exclusion on the basis of race-is perhaps the most
direct legal support that current law offers to the mediating function of the
workplace.
C. Implicationsfor "Due Process" in the Workplace
Most employees, and the overwhelming majority of nonunion privatesector employees, are subject to discipline and discharge at will. The
classic formulation of employment-at-will-the employer's right to fire an
employee for good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all-has been
greatly eroded by the enactment of various wrongful discharge laws and
doctrines, including most prominently the NLRA and Title VII. Most of
those doctrines can be characterized as either anti-retaliation doctrines,
designed to protect socially valued speech or conduct, or
antidiscrimination doctrines, designed to prohibit adverse treatment on the
basis of traits-usually immutable traits-or group membership. It is still
fair to say that the typical at-will employment relationship is terminable
for good reason or for no reason, but the right to discharge an employee for
"bad reasons" is limited indeed.
But what remains of the at-will background rule continues to
undermine and distort the application of the wrongful discharge
doctrines. 99 This proposition has particularly important implications for
the role of the workplace as an arena of constructive interracial
engagement. I have argued that this role depends both on a vital minority
presence in the workplace (which depends in turn on prohibiting invidious
discrimination against minorities in hiring, firing, and promotions) and on
a measure of freedom of expression and interaction within the workplace,
free from employer reprisals. Both may be undermined by the at-will rule
and the lack of a baseline requirement of fair treatment in discipline and

99. This section borrows heavily from Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful Discharge
Protectionsin anAt-Will World, 74 Tax. L. REv. 1655 (1996).
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discharges.
An analogy may be helpful. Imagine a society whose citizens had
free speech rights and equal protection rights but no due process rights.
The government could imprison citizens, or banish them, for any reason or
no reason at all without notice, hearing, or proof of the charges; but it
could not punish citizens based on their criticism of the government or
other protected speech, or on the basis of their race or sex. The citizen
who believed she had in fact been punished for speaking against the
government, or singled out on the basis of race or sex, could go to court
and, if she could prove it, secure relief. How free would speech be in such
a system? Without supporting protections of due process against arbitrary
and unfair treatment, would the citizens feel free to challenge the regime
without fear of retaliation? Would members of disadvantaged minority
groups feel secure against discrimination?
The existing system of modified employment-at-will bears some
resemblance to this strange regime. There is a sizable body of wrongful
discharge law that prohibits employers from firing individuals on the basis
of various "bad reasons." However, each of those laws places the burden
of proving employer motive on the employee. In the typical at-will
workplace, the employer has no obligation to give a "good reason" for
discharge.
In the at-will workplace-that is, without those basic
guarantees of rationality, fairness, and process-both the anti-retaliation
laws and the antidiscrimination laws stand on shaky ground.
The at-will background rule doubly undermines Title VII
enforcement. Title VII, juxtaposed to the at-will background rule, places
heavy and onerous burdens on employees. There is first the difficult
burden of proving discriminatory motive.'0° That burden is even greater
because most potential witnesses are also employed by the accused
employer and may fear retaliation if they testify for the plaintiff or refuse
to testify for the employer. To the extent that the protection of employees
against employer retaliation is weakened by the at-will background rule, as
I have argued it is, employees will be reluctant to come forward with
complaints until they have quit or been fired, and will be reluctant to
testify for co-workers or former co-workers who do complain.'0 ' The
100. It is not enough for the plaintiff to show that the employer's proffered
nondiscriminatory explanation for its decision was fabricated; the plaintiff must ultimately
prove that the decision was in fact motivated by discriminatory factors. See St. Mary's
Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
101. There is some empirical evidence for this proposition and for the corollary
proposition that employees protected by "just cause" should be more willing to make
complaints. Title VII complaints by currentemployees (as opposed to employees who have
quit or been fired) are more frequent in union workplaces, where "just cause" is the rule,
than in at-will workplaces. See John J. Donohue 111 & Peter Siegelman, The Changing
Nature of Employment DiscriminationLitigation, 43 STAN. L. REv. 983, 1031-32 & n.145
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result is to make it harder for employees to prove discrimination and
correspondingly easier for employers-or, perhaps more often, biased
supervisors-to minimize the presence of minorities in the workplace.
I want to explore another dimension of the problem of workplace
The juxtaposition of the
equality in an at-will environment.
antidiscrimination laws and the at-will background rule not only
undermines the efficacy of those laws, but also may contribute to perverse
employer incentives and to divisive tensions between members of
"protected groups," such as women and minorities, and other employees.
Let us first look at the present legal landscape through the eyes of a
prospective complainant who has been disciplined or discharged. In the
at-will workplace, simple unfairness or arbitrariness in the decision gives
no basis for relief. The at-will employee must plausibly claim unlawful
discrimination (or retaliation) in order to secure an impartial review of her
otherwise unappealable termination. Those who fit into one of the classes
protected by antidiscrimination law-mainly women, minorities, older and
handicapped workers-may consequently see and claim discrimination
where there is simple garden-variety unfairness. Certainly, if they consult
an attorney about their legal options, they will be encouraged to look for
signs of discrimination. So the gap between the protections of the
antidiscrimination laws and the non-protections of at-will employment
may encourage employees to claim discrimination in response to perceived
unfairness of any kind. Charges of discrimination, if they are seen as
unjustified by other employees, are likely to be divisive and to provoke
hostility.
How are employers likely to react to this legal landscape? Once they
have hired a member of a protected group, they should seek to avoid
obvious signs and statements of discrimination by managers and
supervisors, and to engage in some defensive documentation and process
to head off or defeat discrimination claims. In an otherwise at-will
environment, we would expect litigation-conscious employers to give
more process and more leeway, at least superficially, to employees in
protected groups. It is thus increasingly rare to find "smoking gun"
evidence of discrimination, or to find an employer who does not have
some evidence-at least enough to muddy the waters--of a legitimate
reason for an allegedly discriminatory firing or refusal to promote.
Defensive measures by employers will make it more difficult for
employees to prevail even on meritorious discrimination claims, but they
will hardly avert all litigation, particularly given the incentive for
employees to perceive and claim discrimination. An accusation of
dig-rimination is likely to provoke a vigorous and costly fight, at least in

(1991).
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close (i.e., most) cases. Such an accusation raises the temperature of an
employment dispute and puts the moral reputation of the employer and its
agents on the line. Far more than a claim of "no just cause" or the like, a
claim of discrimination damages the prospects for an amicable resolution
or a mending of the employment relationship.
To the extent that employers see some identifiable classes of
employees--chiefly minorities and women-as posing the risk of a costly
discriminatory discharge claims, a rational response is to discriminate
illegally, but probably undetectably, at the hiring stage. °' Perversely, the
antidiscrimination laws-more specifically, the gap between the protection
those laws afford to some and the lack of protection that employment-atwill affords to others-may thus increase the incentive to discriminate in
hiring.
Let us look at this legal landscape from the standpoint of employees
who are not members of a protected class.'13 However unwieldy existing
remedies for discrimination may be for most employees, their availability
to some may foster resentment by others. It may appear to some white coworkers that minorities are getting something they are not-that the
employer, when dealing with minority employees (and women), is
considering and reviewing adverse decisions more carefully, while they
themselves remain subject to the unalloyed and merciless at-will regime.
Employees who are not "protected" by the antidiscrimination laws may
perceive fairness itself as a privilege from which they are excluded. The
claim of "reverse discrimination" is a tempting response that reflects the
victim orientation of wrongful discharge law and aggravates the dynamic
of fragmentation and polarization.
The dynamics of harassment law in an at-will workplace poses these
issues even more sharply because harassment complaints often directly pit
co-workers against each other, almost invariably along lines of race or sex.
In an at-will workplace, the litigation-conscious employer lacks sufficient
incentive to act fairly and deliberately in response to a harassment
complaint against a co-worker. The failure to discipline the accused coworker may lead to a costly harassment suit; but the discipline or even
102. See id. at 1024; see also Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, The Q-Word as Red
Herring:Why DisparateImpact Liability Does Not Induce Hiring Quotas, 74 TEX. L. REV.
1847 (1996) (developing this argument in the context of disparate impact law). The
argument rests in part on the fact that, as Donohue and Siegelman have shown, the
antidiscrimination laws are much more likely to be enforced at the discharge point than at
the hiring point. See Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 101, at 984.
103. Although Title VII protects all employees against discrimination on the basis of
race, see McDonald v. Santa Fe, 427 U.S. 273 (1976), it is clear that cases such as Weber,
443 U.S. at 193, and Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1442, make discrimination against certain
groups-historically excluded and disadvantaged groups-easier to prove and harder to
justify than discrimination against men and whites.
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discharge of the accused, even if it is unfair and unfounded, does not
ordinarily infringe on any legally enforceable right of the accused. Putting
aside the potentially damaging impact on employee morale-which might
well lead the employer to institute some forms of fair process-the threat
of harassment liability introduces into the at-will workplace a powerful
incentive to act on harassment complaints without due regard for the
interests of the accused.
At the same time, an employer who perceives little threat of a
harassment suit and is hostile to accusations of harassment may be tempted
to get rid of the accuser. This would be illegal, but will often be hard to
prove and easy to rationalize in the at-will workplace. This scenario may
be especially prevalent in the most common setting for harassment
complaints: the overwhelmingly white (or male) work force that is faced
with the pioneers of integration. The juxtaposition of harassment law and
the at-will background rule encourages arbitrary treatment of the accused,
and it facilitates arbitrary treatment of the accuser.
A requirement of just cause for discharge and a fair process for
enforcing it would help to realize the policies underlying each of the
existing exceptions to employment-at-will, while responding to the
concerns-both the valid concerns and those that are understandable but
exaggerated-of those who do not normally qualify for any of those
exceptions.
Some reasonable system of procedural and substantive
fairness for all employees faced with discipline or discharge may better
foster equal treatment, and a perception of equal treatment, within a
diverse work force than does the antidiscrimination regime. Complaints of
unfair or arbitrary treatment could be heard without regard to the race of
the employee and without escalating into more divisive charges of
invidious discrimination that may tend to pit one group of employees
against another.
As in the case of affirmative action, I hasten to disavow any claim
that this is a sufficient justification for the abandonment of employmentat-will. The tendency of a regime of fair treatment for all to mitigate some
of the unintended tensions and distortions that may otherwise follow from
the antidiscrimination laws is only part of the picture that must be
investigated in deciding upon the future of employment-at-will. But it is a
largely overlooked piece of the picture that deserves consideration.
IV.

CONCLUSION: WORKPLACE DEMOCRACY IN A RACIALLY DIVERSE

SOCIETY
The vital role of the workplace in a racially diverse democracy arises
from its construction, primarily by Title VII, as an intermediate institution
that is subject to the antidiscrimination norm and that consequently brings
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into direct, intense, and ongoing contact citizens who are usually divided
along lines of race. I have argued that this workplace community best
promotes constructive interracial interaction if it is governed by some of
the same basic principles of engagement that govern our democratic
society as a whole. After marching through the principles of equality,
freedom of expression, and due process, it can come as no surprise that we
arrive at workplace democracy.
The most complete fulfillment of the role of the workplace in a
racially diverse democracy would require the introduction of democracy
into the racially diverse workplace. The role of the workplace as a "school
for democracy" has been explored by others.0 4 The metaphor was invoked
by key sponsors of the Wagner Act in support of collective bargaining,
which continues to serve as the law's one answer-apart from the
background rules of individual contract-to employee demands for
participation and power in determining the terms and conditions of their
working lives and livelihoods.'05
The New Deal institution of collective bargaining has been
transformed, along with the rest of society, as we have confronted the
imperative of racial reconciliation. Unions that have embraced a diverse
constituency have helped to promote greater equality, greater freedom of
expression, more effective due process, and genuine democratic
participation in the workplace. These unions not only help to cultivate
opportunities for constructive interracial engagement within the workplace
but also create an additional forum for constructive engagement within the
union itself.' 4
This pleasing picture is marred, of course, by the'seemingly relentless
decline of collective bargaining and unionization, particularly in the
private sector, to levels not seen since the Wagner Act was passed in 1935.
The contributing factors are many and complex.
Some of the
responsibility lies with unions themselves, not all of which have responded
effectively to changing economic realities or to the changing face of the
work force. But among the factors contributing to the decline of organized
labor is certainly the determined resistance with which many private-sector
employers meet any whisper of unionization within their work forces.' 7
104. On the importance of intermediate institutions as "schools of democracy," see 1
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 68-71 (J.P. Mayer & Max Lerner eds. &
George Lawrence trans., 1966).
105. The framers of the Wagner Act self-consciously proclaimed its expansion of basic
constitutional freedoms into the workplace. See Clyde W. Summers, The Privatizationof
PersonalFreedoms and Enrichment of Democracy: Some Lessonsfrom Labor Law, 1986
U. IL. L. REV. 689, 697.
106. Cf. Kohler, supra note 19 (on unions as effective mediating institutions).
107. See PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND

EMPLOYMENT LAW 105-18 (1990).
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Employer resistance to unionization has been coupled in recent years
with employer efforts to relax the strictures of section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA
against employer-sponsored forms of employee participation. Employers
contend that they are not opposed to worker participation; they are only
opposed to the outmoded adversarial form of participation that unions
represent. In the eyes of many in the labor movement, employers are
opposed to any form of employee representation that they cannot control,
and will not permit any nonunion form of employee representation to grow
into a genuine source of employee power. But others who support
democratization of the workplace believe that the time has come to permit
greater experimentation with nonunion forms of employee involvement.'
Society's compelling interest in fostering constructive interracial
engagement adds weight, I believe, to the arguments in favor of amending
section 8(a)(2). Whether or not such organizations serve to increase
employee power over terms and conditions of work, they seem quite likely
to foster greater opportunities for constructive interracial engagement by
increasing the range of issues over which discussions can have an impact,
by necessitating compromise of conflicting group interests, and by creating
time within the working day for deliberation over matters of shared
concern. In short, even the mere forms of democracy may have value in
cultivating cooperative relations within a racially diverse work force.
However, the opposite case could be made. Genuine, independent
forms of employee representation promise the greatest contribution to
interracial cooperation as well as to employee self-determination.
Moreover, unionization has historically been the vehicle for introducing
both the most effective forms of workplace due process, through "just
cause" protections and grievance arbitration, and a more vital system of
freedom of expression in the workplace.' 9 Unionization can fortify several
of the elements that I have argued are necessary to the ability of the
workplace to foster constructive interracial interaction. If nonunion
employee representation plans are destined to be shams, to enhance the
employer's power to monitor and manipulate the work force, and to divert
employee energies away from efforts to secure independent representation,
then they might be counterproductive as well for interracial cooperation
among employees.
As I have done at many points in this essay, I must disavow any claim
that the interest in creating arenas for constructive interracial engagement
resolves this major policy question. It simply contributes to the case in
favor of democratization of the workplace and for creating some effective
legal mechanism for collective employee representation and participation
108. See, e.g., id. at 282-95, 307-11.
109. The vital connection between due process and free speech in the workplace, and the
role of unions in fostering both, is explored in Estlund, supra note 80, at 101.
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in workplace decisions. That may mean strengthening the enforcement of
long-established protections for traditional concerted activity, including
union organizing. It may mean lowering legal barriers to alternative forms
of employee representation, or even mandating some form of employee
representation. Above all, it means that the stakes in these debates are
higher than is commonly believed. Workplace democratization would
greatly enhance the crucial role of the workplace in promoting genuine
integration and interracial understanding in the society.

